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FINANCIAL STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Economic Stability in International Law 
FEDERICO LUPO-PASINI* 
In the current interdependent global economic system, measures adopted nationally by 
governments to safeguard financial stability sometimes produce cross-border spillovers. A 
question arises as to how international economic law shall treat states’ regulatory powers to 
tackle internal and external economic and financial threats. The goal of the research is to 
analyse (i) how international law distributes between different international subjects the social 
costs of global instability in the event of emergencies, and (ii) how regulatory powers are 
attributed in a situation of economic and financial interdependence. To do so, this article sets out 
a law and economics theory that conceptualises financial stability in international law as the 
result of a trade-off between three competing regulatory objectives: domestic stability, global 
stability, and financial integration. The way in which the interplay between these objectives is 
represented in law crucially influences the balance of rights and obligations in the formulation of 
national economic and financial policies, and the level of protection against economic threats. 
This article argues that current international law is largely inefficient because it structures the 
protection of financial stability as a matter of the individual rights of each state, rather than a 
social problem of the international community. 
CONTENTS 
I Financial Stability and Financial Integration in International Law .......................... 5 
A The Three Objectives of the International Law of Financial Stability ......... 6 
1 Financial Integration ........................................................................ 6 
2 Domestic Stability ............................................................................ 8 
3 Global Stability ................................................................................ 8 
B Conflicts and Trade-Offs .............................................................................. 9 
1 Domestic Stability versus Financial Integration in International  
 Law.. ............................................................................................... 10 
2 Domestic Stability versus Global Stability in International Law ... 12 
II The ‘Problem Of Sovereignty’ in the Law of Financial Stability ........................... 14 
A Externalities Affecting Financial Integration ............................................. 15 
1 Impossibilities ................................................................................ 16 
2 The Inefficiency of the Current Law .............................................. 17 
B Externalities Affecting Global Stability ..................................................... 19 
1 The European Free Trade Area Surveillance Authority v Iceland 
Dispute ........................................................................................... 20 
III Less Sovereignty or More International Law? ........................................................ 22 
1 A World Financial Government? ................................................... 22 
2 The Promise of Binding International Law .................................... 23 
IV Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 25 
The notion of financial stability has tended to elude any uniform 
conceptualisation, either in pure economic theory or in the law.1 From an 
                                                 
 * Lecturer, Queen’s University Belfast, School of Law. 
 1 See Garry J Schinasi, ‘Defining Financial Stability’ (Working Paper No 04/187, 
International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’), 2004) 13–16 
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04187.pdf> archived at 
<https://perma.cc/U843-VS78>; for a definition of monetary stability, see Rosa María 
Lastra, Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability (Oxford University Press, 
2006) 34–9. 
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economic point of view, it can be very simply described as the absence of crises 
or systemic risks. From a policy and legal perspective, however, the achievement 
of a stable economy is the culmination of a long and complex regulatory and 
political process that involves the formulation and implementation of different 
economic policies and the critical attribution of regulatory powers to different 
subjects at the domestic and international levels.2 The pursuit of financial 
stability and economic efficiency has always ranked as one of the foremost 
policy objectives of any state. Monetary authorities set interest rates to encourage 
either investment or savings; fiscal authorities design tax policies to promote 
business and labour creation. During a crisis, financial authorities intervene in 
the market through ‘lender of last resort’ operations or bailout programs to 
maintain financial stability. 
The fundamental role that financial, fiscal, and monetary stability play in 
domestic policy is reflected in international law in the fact that, with the notable 
exception of the European Union,3 most of the policies that contribute to 
maintaining a stable economy have been historically largely excluded from 
international obligations. Monetary authorities can set the appropriate interest 
rates and control the level of liquidity in their economy without suffering any 
legal constraints,4 and, to a lesser extent, they are free to manage their exchange 
rate policy.5 Furthermore, in the context of finance, national supervisors are, in 
                                                 
 2 See Federico Lupo Pasini, ‘Economic Stability and Economic Governance in the Euro Area: 
What the European Crisis Can Teach on the Limits of Economic Integration’ (2013) 16 
Journal of International Economic Law 211, 235–7. 
 3 See Lastra, above n 1, chs 6, 12. 
 4 Ernst Baltensperger and Thomas Cottier, ‘The Role of International Law in Monetary 
Affairs’ (2010) 13 Journal of International Economic Law 911, 912; More specifically on 
monetary sovereignty, see Lastra, above n 1, 5–32; Claus D Zimmermann, A Contemporary 
Concept of Monetary Sovereignty (Oxford University Press, 2013); Claus D Zimmermann, 
‘The Concept of Monetary Sovereignty Revisited’ (2013) 24 European Journal of 
International Law 797; Tullio Treves, ‘Monetary Sovereignty Today’ in Mario Giovanoli 
(ed), International Monetary Law: Issues For the New Millennium (Oxford University 
Press, 2000); François Gianviti, ‘Current Legal Aspects of Monetary Sovereignty’ in IMF 
(ed), Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law (IMF, 2005) vol 4. 
 5 On exchange rate, see Claus D Zimmermann, ‘Exchange Rate Misalignment and 
International Law’ (2011) 105 American Journal of International Law 423. 
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principle, legally free to adopt or ignore international financial standards6 and to 
choose when and how to intervene in the event of a local banking crisis.7 
However, the increased pace of economic and financial integration and the 
closer interdependence among economies achieved in the last few decades has 
placed in the spotlight the global implications of economic sovereignty that were 
not visible long ago, and this deserves closer examination.8 Recent events show 
that stability and instability are no longer purely domestic matters. For example, 
unsustainable macroeconomic and fiscal policies can transmit instability to 
neighbouring countries and cause losses to foreign investors;9 the adoption of 
national solutions in response to the collapse of globally systemic important 
banks can easily spread systemic risk and financial contagion across national 
borders;10 or the adoption of expansionary monetary policies that result in 
excessive liquidity in international markets can cause problems in other 
                                                 
 6 International financial standards are not binding. However, some authors argue that as result 
of the institutional pressure from the IMF or World Bank and the market pressure from 
private investors, international financial standards have to be considered as de facto hard 
laws. On compliance with international financial standards, see Chris Brummer, ‘How 
International Financial Law Works (and How It Doesn’t)’ (2011) 99 Georgetown Law 
Journal 257; Chris Brummer, ‘Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance — and Not 
Trade’ (2010) 13 Journal of International Economic Law 623, 638; Chris Brummer, Soft 
Law and the Global Financial System: Rule Making in the 21st Century (Cambridge 
University Press, 2012). A few authors go further, arguing that the adoption of financial 
standards as a result of the IMF conditionality does undermine national sovereignty. See 
Andreas F Lowenfeld, ‘The International Monetary System and the Erosion of Sovereignty: 
Essay in Honor of Cynthia Lichtenstein’ (2002) 25 Boston College International & 
Comparative Law Review 257; Robert P Delonis, ‘International Financial Standards and 
Codes: Mandatory Regulation Without Representation’ (2004) 36 New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics 563. 
 7 Eva H G Hüpkes, The Legal Aspects of Bank Insolvency: A Comparative Analysis of 
Western Europe, the United States and Canada (Kluwer Law International, 2000); Thomas 
C Baxter Jr, Joyce M Hansen and Joseph H Sommer, ‘Two Cheers for Territoriality: An 
Essay on International Bank Insolvency Law’ (2004) 78 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 
57, 73–6; Rosa Maria Lastra, ‘Lender of Last Resort, an International Perspective’ (1999) 
48 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 340; Rosa M Lastra, ‘Northern Rock, UK 
Bank Insolvency and Cross-Border Bank Insolvency’ (2008) 9 Journal of Banking 
Regulation 165; Rosa María Lastra, ‘Systemic Risk, SIFIs and Financial Stability’ (2011) 6 
Capital Markets Law Journal 197; Rosa María Lastra, ‘Cross-Border Bank Insolvency: 
Legal Implications in the Case of Banks Operating in Different Jurisdictions in Latin 
America’ (2003) 6 Journal of International Economic Law 79. 
 8 For a general overview of the problems of globalisation and international spillovers, see Ian 
Goldin and Mike Mariathasan, The Butterfly Defect: How Globalization Creates Systemic 
Risks and What to Do about It (Princeton University Press, 2014). 
 9 See Domingo Cavallo, ‘Argentina and the IMF During the Two Bush Administrations’ 
(2004) 7 International Finance 137; Padma Desai, Financial Crisis, Contagion, and 
Containment: From Asia to Argentina (Princeton University Press, 2003); Carlo Bastasin, 
Saving Europe: How National Politics Nearly Destroyed the Euro (Brookings Institution 
Press, 2012). 
 10 On the spillovers resulting from the insolvency of a cross-border bank, see Stjin Claessens et 
al, ‘A Safer World Financial System: Improving the Resolution of Systemic Institutions’ 
(Report No 12, International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies and Centre for 
Economic Policy Research, 2010); See also Richard Herring, ‘The Challenge of Resolving 
Cross-Border Financial Institutions’ (2014) 31 Yale Journal on Regulation 853.  
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countries.11 Finally, sometimes during times of crisis the very protection of 
financial stability in one state might require the sacrifice of other states’ rights 
under international law, such as by suspending the application of a treaty. 
These examples illustrate that in an integrated financial system such as now 
exists, implementation of domestic fiscal, financial, or monetary policies in one 
state could very well produce negative repercussions in other states. Such 
realities pose fundamental questions for international law that have not yet been 
fully addressed. The present article has the objectives of filling a gap in the 
literature and conceptualising in a more coherent fashion the question of 
financial stability in international law in both its domestic and global 
dimensions. In doing so, this article will conduct a basic law and economics 
analysis of the various international norms dealing with financial stability.12 In 
this regard, the concept of financial stability is intended in this article rather more 
broadly than in the classical financial literature, which conceptualises it as a 
phenomenon purely limited to the financial system: as the absence of systemic 
risks and inter-bank contagion. Rather, this article wants to look at financial 
instability as a more encompassing phenomenon, which encapsulates different 
and not strictly financial aspects, such as monetary or sovereign debt crises. For 
the same reason, when this article refers to financial integration, it refers to a 
situation of broader economic integration, which also encompasses free trade in 
goods and services, and capital mobility. 
Two fundamental insights to help understand the law of financial stability will 
be offered. First, it will be suggested that the international law of financial 
stability should be conceptualised as a trade-off between three legal objectives: 
(i) domestic stability, (ii) global stability and (iii) financial integration. The level 
of protection that international law accords to each of these directly affects the 
protection afforded to the other two.13 Hence, the protection of financial stability 
should be analysed in terms of the regulatory power that international law 
attributes to states in achieving one of the objectives while sacrificing the others, 
as well as in the conflict between states’ opposing goals. Secondly, it will be 
suggested that some of the consequences of the current regulatory framework 
                                                 
 11 On quantitative easing, see Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli et al, ‘Unconventional Monetary 
Policies — Recent Experience and Prospects — Background Paper’ (Background Paper, 
IMF, 18 April 2013) <https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/041813.pdf> archived 
at <https://perma.cc/82ME-GBEZ>; on the external impact of quantitative easing, see 
Marcel Fratzscher, Marco Lo Duca and Roland Straub, ‘On the International Spillovers of 
US Quantitative Easing’ (Working Paper No 1557, European Central Bank, June 2013) 
<http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1557.pdf> archived at 
<https://perma.cc/EJN3-44HJ>. 
 12 On economic analysis of international law see, Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P Trachtman, 
‘Economic Analysis of International Law’ (1999) 24 Yale Journal of International Law 1; 
Joel P Trachtman, The Economic Structure of International Law (Harvard University Press, 
2008); Jack L Goldsmith and Eric A Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2005); Eric A Posner and Alan O Sykes, Economic Foundations of 
International Law (Harvard University Press, 2013). 
 13 This theory was enunciated in the famous Harvard Law Review article by Guido Calabresi 
and A Douglas Melamed that developed, among others, the concept of the protection of 
legal entitlements. See Guido Calabresi and A Douglas Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral’ (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089. 
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can be better understood by using the concept of externalities.14 More 
specifically, this article will argue that sovereign control over its domestic 
financial stability produces externalities on partner countries. Accordingly, 
optimal protection of global financial stability should rely on the internalisation 
of such externalities by law. 
The article will be divided into four parts. After the introduction, the first Part 
will conceptualise financial stability as a conflict between the three legal 
objectives and explain how the current international norms dealing with financial 
stability addresses conflicts and trade-offs between them. The second Part will 
discuss the concept of economic sovereignty and its relationship to the protection 
of global financial stability. It will analyse how sovereignty affects the interplay 
between the three objectives, and it will develop the concept of sovereignty as a 
negative externality. The third Part will discuss two possible solutions to the 
problem of externalities, namely the centralisation of financial governance into 
supranational authorities, and the adoption of a binding international law 
framework for financial stability. 
I FINANCIAL STABILITY AND FINANCIAL INTEGRATION IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
In their famous essay, Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed state that the 
first issue that any legal system faces is to solve what they call ‘the problem of 
“entitlement”’.15 In any society, different groups of people have conflicting 
interests or goals that might sometimes collide. The role of the law, in regard to 
such conflicts, is to solve them by legitimising the pursuit of one objective and 
disfavouring the other. In the words of the two authors, the law shall decide 
which party will be ‘entitled to prevail’.16 The problem of entitlement is not 
unique to domestic law. In international law the same problem arises in all 
spheres of interstate interaction, from environmental regulation to the law of the 
sea.17 Thus, the role of international law is to devise a regulatory framework that 
legitimises the pursuit of one interest over the others and allocates rights and 
obligations between states where conflicts occur. 
The analysis of financial stability in international law fits particularly well 
within this interpretative framework. The high level of economic (especially 
financial) integration between states, coupled with the mechanisms of economic 
                                                 
 14 On the concept of externality in law and economics, see Steven Shavell, Foundations of 
Economic Analysis of Law (Harvard University Press, 2004) ch 5; Carl J Dahlman, ‘The 
Problem of Externality’ (1979) 22 Journal of Law and Economics 141; Howard F Chang, 
‘Carrots, Sticks, and International Externalities’ (1997) 17 International Review of Law and 
Economics 309.  
 15 Calabresi and Melamed, above n 13, 1090. 
 16 Ibid. 
 17 For a comprehensive study on the subject in international law, see Joost Pauwelyn, Optimal 
Protection of International Law: Navigating between European Absolutism and American 
Voluntarism (Cambridge University Press, 2008). Note other authors that have applied the 
same methodology in international law: Jonathan Baert Wiener, ‘Global Environmental 
Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context’ (1999) 108 Yale Law Journal 677; Warren 
F Schwartz and Alan O Sykes, ‘The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute 
Resolution in the World Trade Organization’ (2002) 31 Journal of Legal Studies S179; 
Richard Morrison, ‘Efficient Breach of International Agreements’ (1994) 23 Denver Journal 
of International Law and Policy 183. 
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policies, often leads to situations in which the pursuit of an objective by one state 
entails the sacrifice of another’s objective. The first part of this section will 
introduce these objectives and briefly analyse if and how the law currently 
protects them as individual entitlements. The second part will then analyse how 
international law disciplines their trade-offs in the presence of a conflict. 
A The Three Objectives of the International Law of Financial Stability 
The question of financial stability in international law can be conceptualised 
as a trade-off between three broad and interrelated objectives: (i) the pursuit of 
financial integration, (ii) the protection of domestic stability, and (iii) the 
protection of global stability. The law protects them differently in different cases. 
Sometimes, they are protected as the entitlements of individual states, enshrined 
in binding international treaties or protected by customary international laws. In 
other cases, however, the pursuit of these objectives is not clearly addressed by 
the law. They are nothing more than broad policy goals not framed in legal terms 
and whose realisation relies only on voluntary cooperation. This section 
introduces them. 
1 Financial Integration 
The modern global economy relies on substantial economic 
interdependence.18 The question of financial stability in international law is 
therefore linked to, and dependent on, the process of economic (and especially, 
financial)19 integration. The relationship between financial integration and 
financial stability is most visible in two different circumstances. The first arises 
due to the role of monetary, trade and financial integration as a vehicle for cross-
border contagion or spillovers.20 Indeed, the same treaties that enable market 
integration also promote the reduction of those regulatory and administrative 
barriers that act as a natural safeguard against external instability. Secondly, in 
certain circumstances (for instance, during a balance of payments crisis),21 the 
distressed country might decide to increase barriers — and thus suspend the 
application of economic treaties — to safeguard its domestic financial stability.22 
The protection of financial integration is one of the three most important 
elements for the law of financial stability, and, more generally, one of the most 
                                                 
 18 See IMF, ‘Understanding Financial Interconnectedness’ (Report, IMF, 4 October 2010). 
 19 For literature on the relationship between financial integration and financial stability, see 
World Trade Organization, ‘Financial Services: Background Note by the Secretariat’ 
(Background Note No S/C/W/72, World Trade Organization, 2 December 1998).  
 20 See IMF, ‘Global Financial Stability Report: Meeting New Challenges to Stability and 
Building a Safer System’ (World Economic and Financial Surveys, IMF, April 2010); IMF, 
‘Global Financial Stability Report: Transition Challenges to Stability’ (World Economic and 
Financial Surveys, IMF, October 2013); IMF, ‘2012 Spillover Report’ (Report, IMF, 9 July 
2012); Goldin and Mariathasan, above n 8, ch 2.  
 21 Shailendra J Anjaria, ‘Balance of Payments and Related Issues in the Uruguay Round of 
Trade Negotiations’ (1987) 1 The World Bank Economic Review 669; Isaiah Frank, ‘Import 
Quotas, the Balance of Payments and the GATT’ (1987) 10 The World Economy 307; 
Chantal Thomas, ‘Balance-of-Payments Crises in the Developing World: Balancing Trade, 
Finance and Development in the New Economic Order’ (2000) 15 American University 
International Law Review 1249. 
 22 Frieder Roessler, ‘Selective Balance-of-Payments Adjustment Measures Affecting Trade: 
The Roles of the GATT and the IMF’ (1975) 9 Journal of World Trade Law 622. 
2017] Financial Stability in International Law 7 
important objectives of international law. Over the last 60 years, most of the 
regulatory efforts of international economic lawyers and policymakers were 
directed at creating an international economic system in which factors of 
production could freely move across borders with minimum difficulty and with 
the highest level of protection.23 From a legal viewpoint, such an integrated and 
liberalised economic system was achieved by the adoption of various treaties that 
enabled, among other things, the free movement of capital,24 the cross-border 
establishment of international financial institutions, and free trade in goods and 
services. The process of financial integration is subject to a high degree of 
legalisation,25 and it is structured through different international regulatory 
instruments. It is achieved by all those international norms that increase the 
scope of the market and provide the necessary conditions for financial 
institutions and investors to be treated fairly and equally. We can conceptualise 
the various norms that enable financial and economic integration or market 
expansion as legal entitlements.26 Crucially, the objective of financial integration 
is structured by the protection of exporters’ and investors’ rights.27 Traders and 
investors are granted a certain standard of treatment from partner countries in 
exchange for reciprocal treatment. Such norms comprise market access rights, 
non-discrimination rights, fair and equitable standards of treatment, non-
expropriation rights, and free capital mobility. They are protected by a body of 
international agreements, comprising the World Trade Organization Agreements 
(‘WTO Agreements’),28 Free Trade Agreements, the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (‘OECD’) Code of Liberalisation of Current 
Invisible Operations and the OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital 
Movements,29 as well as International Investment Agreements (‘IIAs’). 
                                                 
 23 Rawi Abdelal, Capital Rules: The Construction of Global Finance (Harvard University 
Press, 2007); Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International 
Monetary System (Princeton University Press, 2nd ed, 2008); Barry Eichengreen, Global 
Imbalances and the Lessons of Bretton Woods (MIT Press, 2007).  
 24 For a quick overview of the various regulatory instruments that promote free capital 
mobility, see Federico Lupo Pasini, ‘Movement of Capital and Trade in Services: 
Distinguishing Myth from Reality Regarding the GATS and the Liberalization of the Capital 
Account’ (2012) 15 Journal of International Economic Law 581 (‘Movement of Capital and 
Trade in Services’); Federico Lupo Pasini, ‘The International Regulatory Regime on Capital 
Flows’ (Working Paper No 338, Asian Development Bank Institute, December 2011). 
 25 On the concept of legalisation, see Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft 
Law in International Governance’ (2000) 54 International Organization 421; Kal Raustiala, 
‘Form and Substance in International Agreements’ (2005) 99 American Journal of 
International Law 581; Beth A Simmons, ‘The Legalization of International Monetary 
Affairs’ (2000) 54 International Organization 573. 
 26 See Pauwelyn, above n 17, 16–25. 
 27 On this point see, eg, Alan O Sykes, ‘Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A Positive Analysis 
of the GATT “Escape Clause” with Normative Speculations’ (1991) 58 University of 
Chicago Law Review 255, 274–8; Alan O Sykes, ‘Public versus Private Enforcement of 
International Economic Law: Standing and Remedy’ (2005) 34 Journal of Legal Studies 631 
(‘Public versus Private Enforcement’); Schwartz and Sykes, above n 17; Joel P Trachtman, 
‘International Law and Domestic Political Coalitions: The Grand Theory of Compliance 
with International Law’ (2010) 11 Chicago Journal of International Law 127. 
 28 Here I refer to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995).  
 29 See OECD, OECD Code of Liberalisation of Current Invisible Operations (OECD, 2016); 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (‘OECD’), OECD Code of 
Liberalisation of Capital Movements (OECD, 2016).  
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2 Domestic Stability 
The second objective is the protection of domestic stability. In a broad sense it 
could be described as the protection of macroeconomic and financial 
sovereignty. However, from a closer perspective, this objective entails two 
distinct elements. The first is the sovereign right to regulate.30 Accordingly, 
national governments ought to be free to decide independently their economic 
and financial policies and how to implement them. The second is the right to 
protect the economy during an economic emergency (for instance, a domestic 
economic crisis) or against an external threat originating from partner countries, 
as in the case of financial or monetary spillovers. This second goal might require 
either the suspension of those international treaties whose implementation is 
considered to endanger the stability of the national economy, or the reduction in 
the level of integration — for instance, through the adoption of capital controls.31 
As I will discuss later, domestic stability is probably the most protected among 
the three objectives. The power to devise and implement economic policies or 
maintain domestic stability is legally structured as a sovereign prerogative and 
has been largely excluded from any international obligations.32 
3 Global Stability 
The maintenance of global stability is the most elusive and least protected of 
the three objectives. The process of financial integration that took place during 
the last few decades expanded the scope of markets by reducing barriers to trade 
and investment, but at the same time, it created new channels for the 
transmission of instability across borders.33 The peculiar integrated structure of 
finance is particularly prone to the risk of instability. Indeed, it is only necessary 
for one financial intermediary to fail, or a few unwise macroeconomic policies to 
be adopted, to spread contagion across the system. Economists define this 
phenomenon as ‘systemic risk’.34 When a country has an open financial system, 
which enables the free movement of capital or the establishment of cross-border 
                                                 
 30 For a good overview in international economic law, see Markus Wagner, ‘Regulatory Space 
in International Trade Law and International Investment Law’ (2014) 36 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 1. 
 31 For a good overview of capital controls to control capital inflows, see IMF, ‘Recent 
Experiences in Managing Capital Inflows — Cross-Cutting Themes and Possible Policy 
Framework’ (Report, IMF, 14 February 2011) (‘Recent Experiences in Managing Capital 
Inflows’); Lupo Pasini, ‘The International Regulatory Regime on Capital Flows’, above 
n 24; Annamaria Viterbo, International Economic Law and Monetary Measures (Edward 
Elgar, 2012) 150–289. 
 32 For instance, until the 1950s, in case of sovereign defaults the violation of a sovereign bond 
contract could not be enforced in any court outside the defaulting state. States were 
considered fully immune. The situation changed over the years. Nonetheless, even at 
present, bondholders do not have possibility to regain their losses, as most sovereign assets 
outside the national territory are still protected by immunity. See Mark Weidamaier, 
‘Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt’ [2014] 1 University of Illinois Law Review 67. 
 33 For an overview of the problem of international contagion, from an economic perspective, 
see Charles Wyplosz, ‘International Financial Instability’ in Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg 
and Marc A Stern (eds), Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st 
Century (Oxford University Press, 1999) 152, 152–89. 
 34 A good overview of the very concept of systemic risk is provided in Steven L Schwarcz, 
‘Systemic Risk’ (2008) 97 Georgetown Law Journal 193; Iman Anabtawi and Steven L 
Schwarcz, ‘Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical Framework’ (2011) 86 Notre 
Dame Law Review 1349. 
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banks (in economic jargon, an open capital account), global instability can arise 
from different sources, such as cross-border banking crises, sovereign defaults, 
or spillovers originating from legitimate monetary policies. 
Global stability is a relatively new concept in international law. The 
International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’) introduced it for the first time, albeit under 
a different name and focused only on monetary issues, in its 2007 Decision on 
Bilateral Surveillance over Members’ Policies.35 The same concept was 
eventually reformulated and replaced by the 2012 IMF Decision on Bilateral and 
Multilateral Surveillance (‘2012 Integrated Surveillance Decision’),36 which 
broadened the scope of the domestic policies under surveillance.37 The 2012 
Integrated Surveillance Decision develops the concept of systemic stability 
which is to be most effectively achieved when both the balance of payments 
positions and domestic policies of the Member are stable.38 According to IMF 
law, whenever one or both conditions are not present the Member’s policies are 
likely to endanger the stability of other Members and, more generally, the 
monetary system. The IMF concept of systemic stability is, however, imprecise 
in terms of the broader analysis undertaken in this article. Indeed, it is inherently 
limited by the reference in art IV to the exchange rate system, which excludes all 
those domestic policies that, while producing global instability, do not impact the 
exchange rate. This article will refer to a broader notion of global stability 
defined as the absence of global systemic risk or negative cross-border spillovers 
in an integrated economic system. Global stability is, on that definition, the 
situation in which each state is not affected in its domestic stability by external 
spillovers from partner countries’ monetary, financial, or fiscal policies. 
B Conflicts and Trade-Offs 
All three objectives described before ought to be promoted by law, as their 
achievement brings substantial social and economic benefits. However, they 
sometimes come into conflict, as the realisation of one goal by one state 
undermines the accomplishment of another goal by a different state. When such 
a situation arises, the law has to choose between them. 
In the international law of financial stability there are two different conflicts. 
The first is between the protection of financial stability and the protection of 
financial integration. Depending on how the law protects each of these two 
                                                 
 35 The 2007 Decision on Bilateral Surveillance over Members’ Policies developed a concept 
of external stability to define the situation where a country’s ‘balance of payments position 
does not, and is not likely to, give rise to disruptive exchange rate movements’. IMF, ‘IMF 
Executive Board Adopts New Decision on Bilateral Surveillance over Members’ Policies’ 
(Public Information Notice, PIN 07/69, 15 June 2007) 
<https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2007/pn0769.htm#decision> archived at 
<https://perma.cc/3C3A-MQ6P>; see also Sean Hagan, ‘Enhancing the IMF’s Regulatory 
Authority’ (2010) 13 Journal of International Economic Law 955. 
 36 Bilateral and Multilateral Surveillance, Decision No 15203-(12/72) (18 July 2012) 
(‘Integrated Surveillance Decision’). 
 37 According to the Fund, the concept of external stability is now being replaced with 
‘“balance of payments stability” … to refer to an individual member’s external accounts — 
not the stability of the overall system (the latter concept being covered by the term 
“systemic stability”)’: IMF, ‘Modernizing the Legal Framework for Surveillance — An 
Integrated Surveillance Decision’ (Report, IMF, 26 June 2012), 7. 
 38 Integrated Surveillance Decision, above n 36, [4], [7]. 
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objectives and on how it structures their relationship, it will be established 
whether (i) a state might be able to protect its domestic stability thereby 
sacrificing partner states’ entitlements to financial integration, or (ii) the 
protection of financial integration rights will require the sacrifice of domestic 
stability. The second conflict is between the protection of domestic stability and 
the protection of global stability. In the dynamics of the conflict, one state is 
exercising its sovereign right to regulate but, by doing so, it also produces cross-
border spillovers that undermine the financial stability of the receiving country. 
The trade-off between those objectives is particularly difficult. In the words of 
Philip Bobbitt and Guido Calabresi, the law must make a ‘tragic choice’,39 as the 
stability of one state entails the instability of another. It has to determine to what 
extent each objective deserves legal protection vis-à-vis the other and how such 
protection can be best attained. In general terms, the optimal protection of a legal 
entitlement is achieved when the attainment of one objective requires the lowest 
sacrifice of the others. In the mechanics of a conflict, the specific legal attributes 
conferred by law on each objective influences their legal interplay and 
determines their ultimate level of protection.40 The next section will analyse it in 
detail. 
1 Domestic Stability versus Financial Integration in International Law 
Earlier we saw that international trade and investment laws provide states and 
investors with a set of rights which are meant to enable and support the process 
of financial integration. However, sometimes, in an attempt to protect domestic 
stability, a state violates or undermines one or more of its partner’s entitlements 
to financial integration — for instance, their right to the free movement of capital 
or international trade in financial services. One specific example of this conflict 
is in the use of capital controls. States adopt controls for a variety of reasons, but 
mostly as a way to control monetary or financial stability,41 which benefits the 
states adopting them while undermining partner countries’ financial integration 
entitlements. Indeed, capital controls either prevent market access (if they are 
imposed on the inflow) or they prevent market exit (on the outflow). Yet both are 
rights protected by trade42 or investment law.43 A second example of financial 
stability measures that impinge on the right of financial integration in particular 
concerns the use of discriminatory measures in the context of a cross-border 
banking crisis. For instance, in the context of the recent financial crises in 
Europe and the United States, there were various cases of cross-border bank 
insolvencies or resolutions in which financial authorities sometimes favoured 
                                                 
 39 Philip Bobbitt and Guido Calabresi, Tragic Choices (Norton, 1978). 
 40 For a similar analysis in international law, see Pauwelyn, above n 17. 
 41 There is a wide literature on capital controls and capital account measure. See IMF, ‘Recent 
Experiences in Managing Capital Inflows’, above n 31. 
 42 Lupo Pasini, ‘Movement of Capital and Trade in Services’, above n 24. 
 43 See, Abba Kolo and Thomas Wälde, ‘Economic Crises, Capital Transfer Restrictions and 
Investor Protection under Modern Investment Treaties’ (2008) 3 Capital Market Law 
Journal 154; Abba Kolo, ‘Transfer of Funds: The Interaction between the IMF Articles of 
Agreement and Modern Investment Treaties — a Comparative Law Perspective’ in Stephan 
W Schill (ed), International Investment Law And Comparative Public Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2010) 345. 
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local creditors.44 Similarly, in the context of international trade in goods, 
whenever a state suffers serious balance of payments problems, it can suspend 
partner countries’ trading rights by imposing import restrictions.45 
These examples demonstrate that the law solves the conflict between the two 
entitlements by giving preference to domestic stability. The conflict is resolved 
through legal mechanisms which invariably structure domestic stability as a 
sovereign right. The first of these legal mechanisms is the use of ‘carve-outs’.46 
In treaties that deal with financial or monetary matters, or that promote capital 
flows, it is common to see clauses explicitly excluding domestic policies from 
the scope of application of the treaty. The most famous clause dealing with 
financial stability is art 2 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(‘GATS’) Annex on Financial Services, most commonly known as the ‘prudential 
carve-out’.47 Another such clause is art 1(3)(b)–(c) of the GATS (elaborated in 
art 1(b) of the GATS Annex on Financial Services),48 which excludes monetary 
and other macroeconomic policies from the ambit of application of the GATS. 
The role of carve-outs is to distribute and assign regulatory power on financial 
stability to home states thereby leaving full control over financial stability to 
these states. By doing so, these clauses allow each signatory to suspend the 
application of the treaty whenever it decides that observing the treaty provisions 
might reduce its discretion on domestic stability. 
The second mechanism which characterises domestic stability as a sovereign 
right is the use of balance of payments clauses.49 These provisions are present in 
different WTO Agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(‘GATT’), the GATS, the Agreement on Government Procurement, and the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, and in some IIAs. Although 
the specific procedural requirements of these clauses might differ slightly, 
overall these provisions tackle the same underlying problem: a low level of 
monetary reserves. Whenever a Member suffers from a balance of payments 
                                                 
 44 For a good overview of the legal problems affecting cross border bank resolution, see Rosa 
M Lastra (ed), Cross-Border Bank Insolvency (Oxford University Press, 2011). 
 45 Ugochukwu Chima Ukpabi, ‘Juridical Substance or Myth over Balance-of-Payment: 
Developing Countries and the Role of the International Monetary Fund in the World Trade 
Organization’ (2005) 26 Michigan Journal of International Law 701; Deborah E Siegel, 
‘Legal Aspects of the IMF/WTO Relationship: The Fund’s Articles of Agreement and the 
WTO Agreements’ (2002) 96 American Journal of International Law 561, 576–84. 
 46 There is a huge literature on financial stability clauses, mostly in WTO Law. The most 
representative contribution include the following: Lazaros E Panourgias, Banking 
Regulation and World Trade Law: GATS, EU and ‘Prudential’ Institution Building (Hart, 
2006); Anne van Aaken and Jürgen Kurtz, ‘Prudence or Discrimination? Emergency 
Measures, the Global Financial Crisis and International Economic Law’ (2009) 12 Journal 
of International Economic Law 859; Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, ‘GATS’ Prudential Carve Out in 
Financial Services and Its Relation with Prudential Regulation’ (2008) 57 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 613; Bart De Meester, ‘Testing European Prudential 
Conditions for Banking Mergers in the Light of Most Favoured Nation in the GATS’ (2008) 
11 Journal of International Economic Law 609; Thomas Cottier and Markus Krajewski, 
‘What Role for Non-Discrimination and Prudential Standards in International Financial 
Law?’ (2010) 13 Journal of International Economic Law 817. 
 47 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 
April 1994, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) annex 1B (‘GATS’) Annex on 
Financial Services, art 2. 
 48 GATS, 1867 UNTS 3, art 1(3)(b)–(c). 
 49 For an overview, see Viterbo, above n 31, 220, 225, 346, 353. 
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problem, and subject to the procedural conditions laid out in the WTO 
Agreements, it can adopt a set of measures that derogate from its WTO 
commitments. The system envisaged in the WTO allows the invoking party to 
restrict imports either through price-based measures or through the imposition of 
quantitative restrictions.50 
The third group of provisions is emergency clauses.51 Such provisions have a 
different scope of application to those discussed so far. Indeed, they apply only 
to those situations in which it is impossible for a state to perform its treaty 
obligations due to an unforeseeable emergency or a pressing need to protect the 
public interest. Such clauses can be roughly divided in two main groups. On the 
one hand, there are clauses protecting essential security interests that give the 
host state wide discretion to decide if the clause applies. On the other hand, there 
are emergency clauses that link the use of the clause to the rules of necessity in 
customary international law, thereby reducing the ability of host countries to 
ignore the treaty obligations.52 
2 Domestic Stability versus Global Stability in International Law 
The trade-off between domestic stability and global stability can be easily 
conceptualised as the conflict between the right to regulate enjoyed by one 
country and the protection of financial stability enjoyed by another. Such a 
conflict arises when monetary, fiscal, or financial policies in Country A produce 
negative spillovers in Country B or C.53 Sometimes, instability is the involuntary 
effect of optimal domestic policies, while in other situations it is the result of 
government failure.54 This conflict is a relatively new feature of international 
economic law and, arguably, a pressing problem for modern international 
monetary and financial law. The conflict arises from a fundamental asymmetry 
affecting the global financial system, whereby financial institutions and investors 
operate across borders, while the power to protect financial stability remains 
exclusively national. In this situation, national sovereignty over domestic 
stability is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, states need to retain enough 
                                                 
 50 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 
April 1994, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) annex 1A (‘GATT’) art 
XV(5); GATS, 1867 UNTS 3, art XII(1). For a good overview, see Ukpabi, above n 45.  
 51 Van Aaken and Kurtz, above n 46; Bart De Meester, ‘The Global Financial Crisis and 
Government Support for Banks: What Role for the GATS?’ (2010) 13 Journal of 
International Economic Law 27; William J Moon, ‘Essential Security Interests In 
International Investment Agreements’ (2012) 15 Journal of International Economic Law 
481; Jürgen Kurtz, ‘Adjudging the Exceptional at International Investment Law: Security, 
Public Order and Financial Crisis’ (2010) 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
325; William W Burke-White, ‘The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability under BITs 
and the Legitimacy of the ICSID System’ (2008) 3 Asian Journal of WTO & International 
Health Law and Policy 199; Giorgio Sacerdoti, ‘BIT Protections and Economic Crises: 
Limits to Their Coverage, the Impact of Multilateral Financial Regulation and the Defence 
of Necessity’ (2014) 28 ICSID Review 351; Robert D Sloane, ‘On the Use and Abuse of 
Necessity in the Law of State Responsibility’ (2012) 106 American Journal of International 
Law 447. 
 52 See, eg, Treaty Between United States of America and the Argentine Republic concerning 
the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, signed 14 November 1991, 31 
ILM 124 (entered into force 20 October 1994) art XI. 
 53 See IMF, ‘Globalization, Financial Markets, and Fiscal Policy’ (Report, IMF, 16 November 
2007) 26–30. 
 54 We will return on this issue in the last Part of the article.  
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regulatory policy space for economic policy to maintain an efficient domestic 
economy and achieve the preferred domestic policy objectives. But, on the other 
hand, the same domestic policies produce first-order spillovers on other countries 
that ultimately undermine global stability. 
In this situation, international law is confronted with a choice between 
decreased sovereign discretion over the formulation and implementation of 
domestic economic policies on the one hand, and full sovereignty over domestic 
stability with lawful global spillovers, on the other hand. International law has 
chosen the first option: it protects domestic financial stability as a national 
sovereign prerogative at the expense of global stability. As long as a state is 
implementing a domestic stability policy within its sovereign discretion, and as 
long as it participates in the international economic system, it can lawfully 
produce negative cross-border spillovers.55 
The only norms that explicitly protect global stability are in the IMF Articles 
of Agreement (‘IMF Articles’), which do so through the concept of systemic 
stability.56 This concept acknowledges that both sustainable and unsustainable 
domestic macroeconomic and financial policies have a direct effect on the 
stability of the international monetary system and might produce global 
spillovers. However, even in this case the level of protection accorded by IMF 
law is extremely limited. When instability arises from unstable domestic policies 
or an unstable balance of payments position,57 the Fund may, in principle, 
intervene under its bilateral surveillance mandate and request the Member to 
modify the policies.58 However, the reference to a stable system of exchange 
rates, contained in the chapeau of art IV(1) narrows the scope of protection to 
only those policies that actually impact on exchange rate instability.59 
Furthermore, the level of protection required to safeguard systemic stability 
given by art IV differs depending on whether the instability originates from 
balance of payment and exchange rate misalignments or from domestic policies. 
While the obligations that deal with exchange rate misalignment and balance of 
payments stability (contained in sub-ss iii and iv) are, in principle, ‘hard’ (or 
genuine) obligations,60 the two obligations that deal with domestic policies (sub-
                                                 
 55 For a more extensive explanation, see Federico Lupo-Pasini, The Logic of Financial 
Nationalism: The Challenges of Cooperation and the Role of International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2017) (‘The Logic of Financial Nationalism’). In this book, I argue that 
protecting financial sovereignty and domestic interests more, in general, is inefficient in a 
situation of financial integration. In the book, I define this broad attitude as a ‘logic of 
financial nationalism’. For a similar argument, see Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Sovereigns as Trustees 
of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders’ (2013) 107 
American Journal of International Law 295.  
 56 Integrated Surveillance Decision, above n 36. 
 57 More specifically, ‘… a balance of payments position that does not, and is not likely to, give 
rise to disruptive exchange rate movements’: Ibid 99. 
 58 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, UNTS 2 (entered into force 27 
December 1945) art IV, ss 1 and 3. 
 59 According to para 1 of s 1, ‘each member undertakes to collaborate with the Fund and other 
members to assure orderly exchange arrangements and to promote a stable system of 
exchange rates’: Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, UNTS 2 
(entered into force 27 December 1945) art IV, s 1. 
 60 Whether they are hard obligations is, however, highly disputed. For an overview of the 
issue, see Zimmermann, above n 5, 427–37. 
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ss i and ii) were formulated specifically as ‘soft’ obligations.61 Hence, they only 
require members to make their best efforts to achieve certain results.62 Secondly, 
the current formulation of external stability does not tackle those spillovers that 
arise from stable domestic policies (such as excessive liquidity caused by 
expansionary monetary policies), which account for the large majority of 
spillovers. Although the 2012 Integrated Surveillance Decision acknowledged 
that even a situation of domestic stability might produce cross-border spillovers, 
it nonetheless relegated the issue to multilateral surveillance. In essence, the IMF 
will only be able to discuss the matter with the Members, but will not have the 
right to advise on the appropriate policy actions, and there is no obligation on the 
Member in question to modify its policies.63 
II THE ‘PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY’ IN THE LAW OF FINANCIAL STABILITY 
The analysis of the trade-offs between the three objectives presented above 
shows that the current law of financial stability is mostly focused on the 
protection of one objective: domestic stability. However, this safeguard of 
national interests comes at a high price — it sometimes sacrifices foreign traders 
and investors’ rights, and it grants impunity to states to produce cross-border 
spillovers. Sovereignty is, in this context, the legal attribute that most clearly 
defines the current international law of financial stability.64 The following Part 
addresses, from a law and economic perspective, whether the protection offered 
by sovereignty is efficient in a context of economic interdependence. 
The protection of domestic stability as a sovereign right is a direct 
consequence of the political economy dynamics of monetary, financial, and 
fiscal policies. Domestic regulators are bound by a fiduciary duty to their citizens 
— the ultimate beneficiaries of domestic stability — that obliges national 
authorities to focus only on the safety and stability of the financial institutions 
and consumers located in the state territory.65 From the point of view of 
domestic authorities, it is irrelevant whether the protection of domestic stability 
                                                 
 61 Ibid 426. 
 62 Ross Leckow, ‘Symposium: Developing the IMF, the World Bank and the Regional 
Development Banks: The Future of Law & Policy in Global Financial Institutions: The IMF 
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 63 See Integrated Surveillance Decision, above n 36, [9]. 
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 65 See Lupo-Pasini, The Logic of Financial Nationalism, above n 55; Chris Brummer, 
‘Territoriality as a Regulatory Technique: Notes from the Financial Crisis’ (2010) 79 
University of Cincinnati Law Review 499; Charles A E Goodhart and Rosa M Lastra, 
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undermines financial integration or produces spillovers in partner countries.66 As 
long as domestic stability is achieved, national authorities fulfil their legal 
mandate. The principal-agent relationship will push national regulators to adopt 
non-cooperative policies that maximise national welfare with minimal cost (from 
a national perspective), while disregarding the economic and political costs or 
benefits for other nations. Hence, there is a high risk that the pursuit of an 
optimal level of domestic stability will probably result in a suboptimal level of 
global welfare. 
We can conceptualise such effects as the externalities of sovereignty.67 
Externalities are economic jargon for the beneficial or negative effects on third 
parties arising out of the behaviour of agents that are not internalised by the 
agents. Third parties, therefore, either enjoy the beneficial effects of another 
party’s behaviour without paying for them, or they suffer the costs of those 
behaviours without remedy.68 Economic sovereignty produces both negative and 
positive externalities. An example of the positive externalities of domestic 
stability is the optimal protection of banking stability in a country with a 
systemically important banking system, or the protection of monetary stability in 
a reserve currency state. The beneficial effects of stability are enjoyed by all 
those states that share a common integrated financial system or that rely on the 
reserve currency, while none of them actively contribute to the implementation 
of stability policies.69 This article, however, will deal only with the negative 
externalities of economic sovereignty, which is the most pressing issue. These 
can be classified as two main types. The first type is the reduction of the 
financial integration rights of partner countries. The second type is global 
instability. I will discuss them both in the next sections. 
A Externalities Affecting Financial Integration 
Externalities affecting financial integration can be succinctly described as the 
foregone gains suffered by foreign investors or traders due to the failure by home 
                                                 
 66 There is a wide array of economic literature on the subject, especially in the context of 
cross-border banking: see David Andrew Singer, Regulating Capital: Setting Standards for 
the International Financial System (Cornell University Press, 2007); Katia D’Hulster, 
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countries’ authorities to comply with their trade or investment treaty obligations. 
The externalities arise when home countries choose to suspend the application of 
the agreement by invoking carve-outs, emergency clauses, and other legal 
mechanisms, in the pursuit of a domestic stability objective. By excusing non-
compliance, the law operates a choice of value between domestic stability and 
financial integration that places the former above all else. For instance, banks 
wishing to access the host market are prevented from doing so. Foreign portfolio 
investors in local equity or foreign depositors with a local account are prevented 
from repatriating their capital. Investors in sovereign bonds suffer the equivalent 
of an expropriation. Crucially, only rarely does the law provide for compensatory 
adjustment mechanisms for partner countries.70 Most of the time, the protection 
of domestic stability simply entails a net welfare loss for partner countries’ 
exporters and investors which makes the current regulatory framework highly 
inefficient. 
1 Impossibilities 
To understand this argument it is first necessary to draw a parallel with the 
domestic law of contract.71 The only occasion in which a party is excused from 
performing the contract without paying compensation (thus, producing a loss to 
the non-breaching party) is when it is impossible to perform the contract.72 Such 
a situation falls under different legal headings, such as emergency or force 
majeure.73 Impossibility clauses cannot be invoked when the breaching party is 
facing a better option than compliance. On the contrary, as the name suggests, 
impossibility clauses can be invoked only when one party is forced to breach the 
contract because it has no alternative. By not performing the contract, both the 
breaching party and the non-breaching party suffer a loss. The rationale of 
impossibility clauses satisfies the basic demand for fairness and equity. It is 
unfair that the cost of an unplanned and unexpected event, over which none of 
the parties had control, is assumed only by one of the parties. By not imposing 
the costs of the impossibility only on one party, the clause distributes the losses 
                                                 
 70 The only example is expropriation in international investment law. Provided that the 
international investment treaty does not carve out domestic stability or it does not contain a 
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Reinisch (ed), Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University Press, 2008)  
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deriving from the impossibility equally between the parties. Had the breaching 
party been forced to pay compensation to the non-breaching party, the costs of 
the unexpected event would fall disproportionately to one side, with no gains for 
society as a whole. Thus, the use of impossibility clauses requires the presence of 
a fundamental element: the absence of any possibility to control the risk, and, of 
course, the absence of either contracting party’s contribution in creating the 
event. 
In the context of international law, for instance, art 25 of the Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (‘State Responsibility Articles’) 
compiled by the International Law Commission achieves precisely such 
objectives when it states that: ‘necessity may not be invoked by a State as a 
ground for precluding wrongfulness if … the State has contributed to the 
situation of necessity’.74 Furthermore, by denying the benefits of the 
impossibility when the state contributed to it, the law also encourages the 
efficient protection of the contract. Indeed, if the law excused the breaching party 
from paying damages or compensation even when it contributed to the event that 
caused the impossibility or if it could act in time to reduce its effects, the law 
would have the ultimate effect of discouraging parties from exerting an adequate 
level of control over their actions. It would transfer equally to both parties the 
losses of the breach while, in reality, only one of the parties was in the position 
of practical impossibility. The other one simply did not control it, or even may 
have contributed to it. 
2 The Inefficiency of the Current Law 
With the notable exception of expropriations in investment law, the current 
international law of financial stability largely treats the protection of domestic 
stability as if it originated from a pure impossibility to perform the treaty. 
However, only rarely the impossibility originates outside the sphere of control of 
the invoking party. That is, the law excuses non-compliance with treaty 
obligations without requiring the payment of compensation to partner countries, 
thereby sacrificing partner countries’ treaty rights.75 
The clearest example is, of course, the use of carve-outs. Whenever a WTO 
Member invokes art 2 of the Annex on Financial Services, or whenever a similar 
provision (for instance, to protect an essential security interest) is contained in an 
investment treaty, the invoking member is not only excused from performing the 
treaty, but crucially, it does not need to compensate the affected party. Similarly, 
the invocation of necessity, when justified under the treaty and customary 
international law, excuses the invoking state from paying compensation.76 The 
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same result is also achieved by the balance of payments clauses in international 
trade law, which entitle the invoking state to impose tariff increases or 
quantitative restrictions. In none of the three major WTO provisions on balance 
of payments (arts XII and XVIII of the GATT, and art XII of the GATS) is the 
invoking member required to provide compensatory adjustments the same way it 
does, for instance, in the context of the safeguard clause of art XIX of the GATT. 
An efficient use of these clauses would demand the critical event to be 
completely outside the sphere of control of the parties, as suggested by art 
25(2)(b) of the State Responsibility Articles in the context of the application of 
state of necessity.77 However, only rarely are the necessary elements for the use 
of impossibility clauses present in the context of financial stability policies. A 
legitimate situation of impossibility would arise when an agriculture intensive 
economy experiences a bad harvest or an earthquake that reduces its export 
potential, thereby leading to a negative balance of payments position. In such a 
case the use of quantitative restrictions allowed by the GATT would be tolerated. 
The social costs of the earthquake would be placed on both the breaching and the 
non-breaching countries, as none of them had the possibility to control the 
natural event. Most of the time, however, when a domestic stability policy is 
implemented in reaction to a domestic situation, and it is invoked as giving rise 
to the impossibility of that state to perform its obligations under a treaty, the 
situation on which the invoking state relies is caused by negligence in the control 
of the risk by that state or is in fact a carefully calculated decision of non-
compliance. We can think, for instance, of sovereign debt defaults or monetary 
crises. A recent example is the Icelandic banking crisis, which originated from 
the risky financial deregulatory process pursued by the Icelandic authorities. 
In all these cases the non-complying state has the full control of its economic 
policies, while the non-breaching state has no possibility to intervene to prevent 
the situation of instability. By excusing compliance, the law transfers the social 
costs deriving from the breach of the treaty to the wrong side, and it discourages 
states from internalising the costs incurred by foreign investors or traders due to 
the non-application of the treaty. In the words of Robert Sloane, the law forgot 
that ‘one state’s safeguarded essential interest will often be another’s seriously 
impaired essential interest’.78 
To promote efficient control of the risk, the law should prohibit the 
application of the clause or require compensation whenever the invoking party 
has contributed to the situation of emergency. A good example is the non-
application of the state of necessity principle in the context of the CMS v 
Argentina case.79 The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(‘ICSID’) tribunal considered that the state of crisis that forced Argentina to 
adopt emergency measures was the result of negligent management of domestic 
policies by the Argentine government. Thus, it placed the burden of the crisis 
entirely on Argentina by demanding the payment of damages to the foreign 
investors.80 
                                                 
 77 See Sloane, above n 51. 
 78 Ibid 505 (emphasis altered). 
 79 CMS Gas Transmission Co v Argentina (Award) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No 
ARB/01/8, 12 May 2005). 
 80 Waibel, above n 76; Kurtz, above n 51.  
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B Externalities Affecting Global Stability 
Earlier we explained how the process of economic and financial integration 
increased the interconnectedness between financial systems, thereby enhancing 
the proclivity for contagion and spillovers. When receiving spillovers, partner 
countries have only two options. Both of them are Pareto suboptimal.81 On the 
one hand, they can simply choose not to respond to the external threat. This 
situation is inefficient because it produces a zero-sum game in which the benefit 
of one state is offset by a welfare loss on partner countries. On the other hand, 
partner countries can choose to protect their own economy by exerting their 
sovereign right to protect their domestic stability. The arsenal of measures 
available to partner countries to safeguard their own domestic stability is 
nonetheless limited. Indeed, given the impossibility of preventing global 
instability by exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction, their only option is to raise a 
barrier against external instability and insulate the country from external threats. 
In this context, reducing or even cutting financial integration is the only lawful 
action partner countries can implement. This strategy of course entails 
fundamental welfare costs, as it sacrifices all the welfare benefits usually 
associated with a situation of integration. 
There are two pertinent examples in this regard. First, the adoption of capital 
controls on the inflow of capital. Various commentators and some emerging 
market economies have recently pledged a more consistent use of capital 
controls to limit excessive global liquidity.82 Such measures are completely 
legitimate under international trade and IMF law, if used to promote domestic 
stability.83 Another example is the use of so-called ring-fencing techniques in the 
context of a cross-border banking crisis.84 Ring-fencing essentially entails 
separating a cross-border bank’s assets or profits in order to subject them to the 
local law. In the context of a cross-border banking crisis, ring-fencing would 
result in preventing the assets or profits of a branch or subsidiary from being 
repatriated or being subject to another state jurisdiction. The goal is to keep such 
assets local and handle them according to local law. Even in this case, the 
entitlement of a trader or investor to move its capital out is undermined. 
                                                 
 81 Pareto efficiency is achieved when the change renders a least one party better off, without 
making the other party worse off.  
 82 Olivier Jeanne, Arvind Subramanian and John Williamson, Who Needs to Open the Capital 
Account? (Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2012). 
 83 See Lupo Pasini, ‘The International Regulatory Regime on Capital Flows’, above n 24. 
 84 Katia D’Hulster and Inci Ötker-Robe, ‘Ring-Fencing Cross-Border Banks: An Effective 
Supervisory Response?’ (2015) 16 Journal of Banking Regulation 169; Alison Lui, ‘Retail 
Ring-Fencing of Banks and Its Implications’ (2012) 13 Journal of Banking Regulation 336. 
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1 The European Free Trade Area (‘EFTA’) Surveillance Authority v Iceland 
Dispute85 
One useful example to highlight the inefficiency of current international law 
in protecting global stability comes from the 2014 EFTA Surveillance Authority 
v Iceland case.86 This dispute, which situates itself in the context of the Icelandic 
Financial crisis of 2008–11 in the period preceding the creation of the European 
Banking Union, is one of very few cases concerning financial stability, and is 
particularly revealing of the attitude of international law in addressing financial 
stability. The dispute originates from the refusal of Iceland to cover the deposit 
insurance scheme for local depositors in branches of the Icelandic bank, 
Landsbanki, in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
According to EU law at the time,87 in the European Economic Area (‘EEA’), 
home states had the primary responsibility to supervise their national banks’ 
foreign branches and to protect local depositors, even if located in another 
country.88 Until recently, the home country control model was a fundamental 
pillar of EU financial law. It is now superseded by a dual structure in which 
Eurozone countries enjoy a single banking supervisor (the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism), while other EU and EEA states still operate through home-country 
models complemented by Colleges of Supervisors.89 The home country control 
model that persists now in the EEA only for non-Eurozone countries entails, 
inter alia, a duty on each Member to set up a national deposit insurance fund that 
is capable of covering both national and foreign depositors of national banks. 
When the home bank went bankrupt at the outset of the 2008 Icelandic banking 
crisis, its operations abroad followed suit, leaving the local depositors in England 
and Netherlands exposed. Iceland refused to prop up the national deposit 
insurance fund (which also became insolvent) thereby forcing host country 
authorities in England and the Netherlands to intervene to protect local 
customers and, more generally, to maintain stability in their respective territories. 
                                                 
 85 For a commentary, see David G Mayes, ‘Did Recent Experience of a Financial Crisis Help 
in Coping with the Current Financial Turmoil? The Case of the Nordic Countries’ (2009) 47 
Journal of Common Market Studies 997. The failure of Iceland to cover Icelandic banks’ 
local depositors in England and Netherland was adjudicated by a European Free Trade 
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Méndez-Pinedo, ‘The Icesave Saga: Iceland Wins Battle before the EFTA Court’ (2013) 1 
Michigan Journal of International Law Emerging Scholarship Project 101; M Elvira 
Méndez-Pinedo, ‘Iceland and the EU: Bitter Lessons after the Bank Collapse and the 
Icesave Dispute’ (2013) 3 Contemporary Legal and Economic Issues 9. 
 86 EFTA Surveillance Authority v Iceland (Judgment) (European Free Trade Authority Court, 
Case No E-16/11, 28 January 2013) (‘EFTA Surveillance Authority v Iceland’) 
<http://www.eftacourt.int/fileadmin/user_upload/Files/News/2013/16_11_Judgment.pdf> 
archived at <https://perma.cc/JL8U-HTW3>. 
 87 Iceland is not part of the European Union. However, by being an EFTA member, it is 
entitled to be a part of the European Economic Area, an economic market between EU and 
EFTA members that entitles EFTA countries to participate in the EU single market. One of 
the conditions for participation is the adoption of almost all EU legislation related to the 
single market. 
 88 Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on 
Deposit-Guarantee Schemes [1994] OJ L 135/5. 
 89 For an overview of EU banking and financial services law, see Larisa Dragomir, European 
Prudential Banking Regulation and Supervision: The Legal Dimension (Routledge, 2010); 
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(Routledge, 2015). 
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The major point of contention for the Court was whether Iceland could be forced 
to protect its foreign bank customers — as required by the home country control 
model — by standing behind the national deposit insurance fund. This was the 
claim of the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the EU Commission. The Court, 
however, accepted Iceland’s view that extending its responsibility to include 
protection of foreign depositors when the depositor protection scheme is illiquid 
would jeopardise domestic financial stability. The economic rationale was that, 
by transferring the liabilities from the private sector to the state, a banking crisis 
would soon turn into a sovereign debt crisis. 
The economic logic of the decision is inescapable.90 However, it is highly 
questionable whether the Court achieved optimal protection of financial stability 
when allocating obligations (and commensurate rights) connected to the 
protection of depositors. The main question is, once again, whether a state should 
bear a duty to take into account the external effects of its policies. Iceland was 
sharing a common financial market with other EEA countries. Through the 
Single Passport, which provides mutual recognition of financial laws across the 
EEA,91 Icelandic banks were automatically allowed to invest and offer services 
in other jurisdictions. Given the interconnectedness between its economy and 
partner countries — including the full removal of regulatory barriers for finance 
— Iceland should have had to take account of the external effects of its domestic 
stability policies. Instead, over the years it was able to promote a process of 
financial deregulation and adopt risky macroeconomic policies. When the crisis 
erupted the whole Icelandic banking sector became insolvent — including the 
deposit insurance fund and, of course, the Icelandic banks’ foreign operations.92 
Iceland transmitted global instability but refused to intervene. When the Court 
accepted Iceland’s view that backing the Icelandic deposit insurance fund would 
have turned a banking crisis into a sovereign debt crisis,93 the court implicitly 
accepted the view that the protection of national interests ranks above global 
stability, and that partner countries should bear the burden of the resultant 
instability. This reasoning is particularly revealing of the general attitude of 
international law already described. It also evidences the same erroneous logic 
that has been raised by this paper: first, partner countries (the host regulator) are 
in a poor position to maintain stability and do not have the resources to supervise 
and regulate home country banks; secondly, by excusing home countries from 
compliance with supervisory duties, a massive moral hazard problem is 
produced, incentivising states to adopt inefficient policies. 
                                                 
 90 Indeed, both Spain and Ireland were on the verge of default when they intervened to bail out 
their own banks. 
 91 Paulina Dejmek, ‘The EU Internal Market for Financial Services — A Look at the First 
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 92 For an overview of the Icelandic crisis and its aftermath, see Annamaria Viterbo, ‘Iceland’s 
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III LESS SOVEREIGNTY OR MORE INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
The previous part demonstrates that the concept of sovereignty and the rules 
of international law are ill-equipped for dealing with the externalities of domestic 
policies, as they prohibit interference into the internal affairs of another state 
except in extreme circumstances. As Robert Keohane succinctly put it, ‘the 
ability of governments to attain their objectives through individual action has 
been undermined by international political and economic interdependence’.94 
Achieving a higher degree of regulatory convergence is therefore the most 
pressing objective of international economic law. How can this objective be 
attained? 
1 A World Financial Government? 
One of the most common responses to the problems of economic globalisation 
is the creation of supranational authorities and a parallel reduction of national 
sovereignty. 
Squaring sovereignty and economic integrations has never been easy. 
Commentators have mostly conceptualised the trade-offs as a choice of evil 
between these two objectives. In the context of cross-border banking supervision 
and resolution, Dirk Schoenmaker succinctly expressed the problem faced by 
partner countries in his so-called ‘financial trilemma’.95 He argued that it is 
impossible to simultaneously achieve national sovereignty over financial stability 
policies, an optimum level of global financial stability, and meaningful financial 
integration. He argues that states have to give up one of them, for instance by 
returning to a situation of reduced financial integration, or by centralising 
supervision into a single supranational authority. The same concept, however, 
can be also applied to other problems affecting financial integration. Indeed, if 
partner countries choose to maintain financial integration (by not imposing 
capital controls or ring-fencing) then they will necessarily suffer instability. On 
the contrary, if they decide to protect their domestic stability, the only way is to 
cut the transmission channels of contagion by suspending market access or non-
discrimination rights for foreign firms, or by disabling international capital 
movements. Schoenmaker’s Trilemma was extremely influential in the aftermath 
of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, as it formed the intellectual basis for the 
creation of the European Banking Union, which replaced Eurozone countries’ 
national supervisory and resolution authorities with two supranational banking 
authorities, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, and the Single Resolution 
Mechanism.96 
Centralising economic and financial policies into supranational authorities, 
however, presents fundamental problems. First, it requires large amounts of 
resources and a very high level of institutional support, which makes it a possible 
strategy only for those countries that are already engaged in substantial economic 
                                                 
 94 Robert O Keohane, ‘Sovereignty, Interdependence, and International Institutions’ in Linda 
B Miller and Michael Joseph Smith (eds), Ideas and Ideals: Essays on Politics in Honour of 
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 96 See Giuseppe Boccuzzi, The European Banking Union: Supervision and Resolution 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 
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and institutional cooperation.97 Secondly, to work effectively, it requires 
democratic political consensus. To understand why, it is useful to refer to Dani 
Rodrick’s famous ‘Political Trilemma of the World Economy’.98 According to 
Rodrik’s theory, it is impossible to square economic integration, national 
sovereignty, and democracy; only two of the three objectives can coexist 
simultaneously. The difficulty in squaring deep economic or financial integration 
with national sovereignty lies in the fact that, in order to be sustainable, deep 
economic integration requires democratic political support. This, however, can 
be achieved only if the decision over economic policies is transferred to the 
supranational level, which then presupposes the end of the nation state. We can 
see the importance of democratic support if we think that, despite the wide 
political support to the Banking Union, European authorities did not manage to 
convince Eurozone states to back the proposal for a Eurozone-wide deposit 
insurance fund.99 A common deposit insurance fund for troubled banks implies 
fiscal solidarity between taxpayers of different countries, which might be called 
to contribute indirectly to save depositors of a foreign bank. Given the huge 
financial size that a Eurozone fund would imply, and considered that taxpayers 
vote in national elections, it was no surprise that European national governments 
did not reach an agreement on the establishment of the fund. For this to be 
possible, it would be necessary, as Rodrick suggests, that democratic institutions 
in support of economic policies be transferred from the national to the 
supranational level.100 
2 The Promise of Binding International Law 
Given the difficulties in creating supranational authorities, it is necessary to 
look for other options. One potential strategy to promote better coordination is to 
use international law to incentivise states to internalise the externalities of their 
actions. 
The current law clearly falls short of these aspirations. The political economic 
foundation of trade and investment agreements is set on an exchange of 
concessions to open up markets. In exchange for participation in economic 
integration treaties it demands only the acceptance of mutual concessions on 
market access or standard of treatment.101 But, generally, it does not require as a 
necessary condition the presence of minimal rules guaranteeing global 
stability.102 For example, in international trade and investment agreements there 
is no explicit requirement subordinating market access or investment protection 
to the adoption of international financial standards set by the International 
Organization of Securities Commission or the Basel Committee on Banking 
                                                 
 97 For a critique of ‘centralisation’, see Lupo-Pasini, above n 55, ch 7.  
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Supervision.103 Undoubtedly, states are in principle free not to enter into 
agreements with countries that do not satisfy the minimum criteria for stability, 
or to demand supplementary conditions.104 However, that is a voluntary decision 
whose adoption depends on the goals and negotiating powers of each party.105 
Similarly, in international investment treaties there is no provision that obliges 
host countries to limit their annual budget deficits or that imposes specific 
macroeconomic measures to minimise the risk of default. Quite the opposite: 
modern investment treaties ‘carve-out’ such policies from their scope.106 
The separation between market access and domestic policies and the general 
exclusion of financial and macroeconomic policies from international legal 
scrutiny is a dangerous combination. The law created the ‘road’ for economic 
interdependence but without imposing the ‘road traffic regulations’ to ensure 
stability. States are free to set their own economic agenda, even if it will 
ultimately be unsustainable in the long term. They are relatively free to opt out 
from their obligations under trade or investment treaties, even when this causes 
external losses to foreign traders or investors. Or they can adopt domestic 
policies that, when producing spillovers, might undermine partner countries’ 
domestic stability. By doing so, however, the law does not encourage them to 
take into account the external effect of their policies, and it thus fails to correctly 
price the costs of participating in an integrated economic system. 
To address the shortcomings of international law, it is therefore necessary to 
force states to pay for the external effects of their policies. One possibility is to 
embed financial standards into trade agreements. In this regard, at the outset of 
the recent global financial and European sovereign debt crises, a few 
commentators suggested the signing of a ‘New Concordat’ which would be 
integrated into the GATS.107 The same model could be extended to other 
agreements. For instance, bilateral investment treaties could refer to the IMF or 
the OECD Codes for the regulatory treatment accorded to portfolio investment, 
and perhaps also integrate into the agreement a mechanism that disciplines 
sovereign debt restructuring.108 
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Another possibility is to bypass WTO law, and move financial integration 
onto a different — perhaps, preferential — negotiating platform in which market 
access in financial services is subordinated to the adoption of a binding 
regulatory platform upon the violation of which market concessions will be 
suspended. The philosophy is similar to that of mutual recognition agreements, 
which are already used with regard to securities offering,109 although it would 
entail a much wider economic bargain. For instance, I suggest the adoption of 
‘Regulatory Passports’ for financial services, ie, binding agreements signed by 
home and host supervisory authorities that discipline both the market access and 
the regulatory/supervisory cooperation aspects of international finance.110 One of 
the implications of this mechanism is the strategic use of discrimination as a 
regulatory tool. Members of a certain economic or financial agreement will 
retain the power to selectively discriminate over market access and standards of 
treatment concessions against those countries that do not offer adequate 
conditions of stability. 
The goal of the abovementioned technique is simply to achieve a win-win 
situation whereby each state gives up part of its sovereignty in exchange for the 
benefits of financial integration and global stability. As such, this regulatory 
strategy is Pareto efficient, as it raises the level playing field of international 
finance without making any country worse off. By linking market access to the 
adoption of a binding regulatory framework (or a code of conduct) for financial 
stability, states wishing to be part of an integrated market are incentivised to 
factor the external dimension of their domestic policies into their decision-
making process, and choose those that are likely to maximise domestic stability 
and global stability. At the same time the law achieves the fundamental objective 
of pricing correctly the costs and benefits associated with the participation in an 
integrated economic system. Experience demonstrates that exporting and foreign 
investment interests have proven to be extremely powerful in driving the 
behaviour of governments, often pushing towards the adoption of cooperative 
and global welfare enhancing approaches.111 Since exporters and investors have 
a powerful voice in driving the international economic policies of their 
government, they will offer the political base necessary for the government to 
implement and lock in welfare enhancing structural reforms, thereby offsetting 
the lobby groups opposing structural reforms or profiting from a lax financial 
regulatory environment.112 
IV CONCLUSION 
The production of externalities from domestic policies is not unique to 
financial stability policy. Where there is economic integration, externalities are a 
common and unavoidable phenomenon in almost all areas of public policy. 
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Ultimately, almost every human action has an external dimension. Consequently, 
in an interdependent society, the objective of the law ought not to be the mere 
prohibition of actions having an external effect. This would simply reduce 
overall global welfare. On the contrary, the law should promote the 
internalisation of the social costs of harmful actions by the agents that engage in 
them and, in doing so, also the maximisation of overall welfare gains. In the 
context of financial stability, the law should therefore prevent abuses, reduce 
where necessary the excesses of unrestrained sovereignty, and devise a more 
acceptable balance between the three objectives in the interests of maximising 
global efficiency and stability. 
In his illuminating treatise on financial crises, Charles Kindleberger noted that 
books and other publications on financial stability usually increase when crises 
occur.113 The events that hit western economies in the last few years, from the 
financial meltdown of 2007–08 to the recent European macroeconomic crisis, 
gave rise to a surge in scholarship on financial and monetary policy and 
regulation. This article situates itself in this broad area of legal scholarship. 
However, it takes a step further from the pure technicalities of financial and 
monetary law, by looking at the broader picture of financial stability as a legal 
concept. This article is intended to fill a perceived gap in legal scholarship by 
conceptualising in a coherent fashion a general theory of financial stability in 
international law that could be used in the future to discuss any policy 
development in this field of law. To do so, this article articulated the concept of 
financial stability as a trade-off between three major objectives of international 
law. Their interplay determines their level of protection, and influences the 
balance of rights and obligations assigned by the law to each state. The article 
then tried to apply the theory to the various norms of financial stability situated 
across different areas of international economic law, from WTO to IMF, to 
cross-border bank resolution. 
When analysing the proper role of the law in addressing stability and the 
sovereign powers necessary for its attainment, it is easy to fall into a moral trap 
and to justify any of the arguments based on abstract social values. This article 
has tried to avoid this trap, and rather chose to analyse stability from the pure 
logic of efficiency and stability. This was the article’s only normative 
assumption. The article provided both a positive and a normative analysis of the 
applicable international law. It offered an overview of how international law 
operationalises the protection of the three objectives that make up the legal 
architecture of financial stability. It also offered a normative evaluation when it 
suggested switching from a protection of financial stability as a sovereign right 
to a protection of financial stability as a social problem of the international 
community. 
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